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I. Introduction: The Stakes

On 27 March 2026, the Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court delivered an order that will directly impact the careers and livelihoods of over ten thousand young professionals across the State of Haryana. By allowing 57 review applications — 54 arising from LPA No. 1037 of 2023 and 3 from CWP No. 1563 of 2024 — the Court corrected what it found to be a fundamental factual error in its earlier judgment dated 31 May 2024: the blanket quashing of CET-based recruitment across all groups, including 24 groups where the socio-economic criteria had absolutely no bearing on the selection process.

The candidates who stood to lose their jobs were not beneficiaries of any illegality. They had qualified CET-I on their own merit. They had appeared for CET-II without any advantage of bonus marks. They had been selected and appointed to posts ranging from Staff Nurses to Fire Operators, Junior Coaches to Laboratory Technicians. The earlier judgment, while correct in its treatment of Groups 56–57 where socio-economic criteria had materially affected shortlisting, had inadvertently extended its findings to groups where the factual premise did not hold.

This article examines the complete factual and legal trajectory of this case — from the CET Policy of 2022 through the multiple rounds of litigation that preceded this review — and analyses the significance of the Division Bench’s findings.

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II. The CET Policy Framework: How It All Began

The Government of Haryana, by notification dated 5 May 2022, introduced a policy for recruitment to Group-C and Group-D posts through a Common Eligibility Test (CET). The architecture was as follows:

The critical factual distinction, which became the pivot of this case, was this: in Groups 56–57, the candidate-to-post ratio was extremely high, and socio-economic criteria materially affected which candidates got shortlisted for CET-II. In 24 other groups, the eligible candidates were fewer than 4–5 times the number of posts, meaning every qualified candidate was permitted to appear — socio-economic marks were irrelevant to selection.

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III. The Litigation Trail: A Chronological Overview

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IV. The Judgment of 31 May 2024: What It Held

The common judgment dated 31 May 2024 addressed the entire batch of CET-related litigation — CWP No. 1563/2024 (Sukriti Malik) being the leading case, along with LPA No. 1037/2023 and connected writ petitions. The Division Bench delivered far-reaching directions:

While the judgment’s holding on the unconstitutionality of the socio-economic criteria was sound and has not been challenged in review, the central problem was that the consequential direction to set aside all selections — including those in 24 groups where socio-economic criteria played no role — was based on findings that pertained exclusively to Groups 56–57.

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V. The Core Arguments in Review

A. Arguments for the Review Applicants

The review applicants, through Senior Counsel, raised a tightly focused set of contentions:

First, that none of the selected candidates in the 24 groups had availed the benefit of socio-economic criteria marks. This was supported by categorical affidavits from the Commission and the State.

Second, that in all 24 groups, the number of eligible candidates was fewer than 4–5 times the number of posts. This meant every qualifying candidate was permitted to appear for CET-II — there was no shortlisting based on CET Score, and therefore no occasion for socio-economic marks to influence the selection.

Third, that the observations from paragraph 52 onwards in the judgment under review pertained exclusively to Groups 56–57 and could not logically be extended to groups where the factual premise was entirely different.

Fourth, that no selected candidate in the 24 groups was ever impleaded or heard before the passing of the original judgment — a clear violation of principles of natural justice.

B. Stand of the State of Haryana

The Advocate General of Haryana supported the review applicants’ position through detailed affidavits, confirming that the Commission had prepared two parallel lists — one with socio-economic marks and one without — and that 10,233 candidates were common to both. The Commission declared results only for these common candidates, expressly stating that their selection was “independent of socio-economic marks.”

C. Arguments by Intervenors Opposing the Review

Intervenors contended that the review was not maintainable given the dismissal of the SLP by the Supreme Court. They also argued that the amended result — showing post-allocation changes for 554 candidates and category changes for 207 — demonstrated that the selection was not truly independent of socio-economic criteria. They further submitted that the candidates should not be permitted to claim equity under interim orders.

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VI. The Division Bench’s Analysis and Findings

A. On Maintainability — The Doctrine of Merger

The Court emphatically rejected the merger objection, relying on Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359, followed by Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 376, and the recent Vishnu Vardhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1501.

The Division Bench held that since the SLP was dismissed without grant of leave and without any expression of views on the merits, the principle of merger was not attracted. The mere summary dismissal of an SLP does not result in the High Court’s judgment merging with the Supreme Court’s order.

B. On Merits — The Factual Distinction

This was the heart of the judgment. The Court examined the recruitment scheme in detail and arrived at the following key findings:

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VII. The 24 Groups at a Glance

A. Where Applicants Were Fewer Than 4/5 Times the Posts

B. Where Eligible Candidates Were Fewer Than 4/5 Times the Posts

These numbers tell a powerful story. In Group 28 (Modeler), there were 4 posts and only 1 eligible candidate. In Group 19 (Boiler Attendant), 3 posts and only 2 eligible candidates. The idea that socio-economic marks could have influenced the outcome in these groups is patently untenable.

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VIII. Legal Significance of the Review Order

A. Review Jurisdiction — Scope and Limits

The power of review is narrow. Under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a review lies only on the ground of discovery of new and important matter or evidence, some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason. The Supreme Court has consistently held that review is not an appeal in disguise and cannot be used to re-argue the case on merits.

In this case, the Division Bench found that the error was “apparent on the face of the record” — the findings in the judgment under review were based on a factual premise (that socio-economic marks influenced selection in all groups) that was demonstrably incorrect for the 24 groups. This is the kind of manifest error that squarely falls within the scope of review jurisdiction.

B. Natural Justice — Non-Impleadment of Selected Candidates

The Court explicitly noted that the selected candidates in the 24 groups were never impleaded as parties, nor given any opportunity to present their case. While it acknowledged that the recruitment was subject to pending proceedings, the Court found that prejudice had been caused on account of non-impleadment — particularly because the factual position regarding the 24 groups was materially different from Groups 56–57.

C. The Doctrine of Merger — Definitively Addressed

The Court’s treatment of the merger doctrine is noteworthy. By relying on the authoritative pronouncements in Kunhayammed, Khoday Distilleries, and the recent Vishnu Vardhan decision, the Court firmly established that a summary dismissal of an SLP — even with brief reasons — does not attract the doctrine of merger. The review jurisdiction of the High Court survives intact in such circumstances.

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IX. Impact and Significance

The ramifications of this order are substantial:

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X. A Personal Note

As counsel appearing in this matter — assisting Mr. Chetan Mittal, Senior Advocate, and appearing independently in several connected review applications — this victory carries a significance beyond the courtroom. Behind the case numbers and legal arguments are real people: young men and women who passed rigorous examinations, joined their posts in good faith, and suddenly found their appointments hanging in the balance on account of a judicial finding that had nothing to do with them.

The review applicants in RA-LP-44-2024, RA-LP-82-2024, RA-LP-15-2025, RA-LP-28-2025, RA-LP-45-2025, RA-LP-38-2025, RA-LP-37-2025, and RA-LP-81-2025 — among others — represent the faith that ordinary citizens place in the judicial process. That faith has been justified.

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XI. Conclusion

The order dated 27 March 2026 in RA-LP-19-2024 (O&M) is a testament to the self-correcting nature of the judicial process. Where an error — even one rendered in a carefully considered judgment — results in disproportionate consequences for persons who were neither heard nor responsible for the illegality being addressed, the review jurisdiction exists precisely to provide a corrective. The Division Bench’s willingness to examine the facts afresh, acknowledge the oversight, and restore justice to over ten thousand candidates is an affirmation of the highest ideals of the judicial system.

The judgment under review remains undisturbed insofar as it relates to the unconstitutionality of the socio-economic criteria and the quashing of recruitment in Groups 56–57. What has been corrected is the inadvertent extension of those findings to groups where the facts were materially different. This is not a reversal of the earlier judgment — it is its refinement.

As the Court observed: the distinction drawn on facts between Groups 56–57 and the 24 groups had been overlooked — and it was this oversight that the review jurisdiction was invoked to correct.

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